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1.1 David Hume was a man of letters intent on erasing all trace of his Scottishness from 
his books. He was acutely sensitive to the differences between Scots and English, and 
sought tirelessly to ensure that each new edition of his works was more 'correct' than the 
last. From the first, he wanted a British, not just a Scottish, readership for what he wrote, 
and he was always keen also to have his books translated into French, the language of the 
international republic of letters. After the success across Europe of the Political Discourses 
of 1752, Hume wrote with an international audience in mind. At one point in his life, in 
fact, he thought of Paris as his natural home. When his friendship with Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau collapsed into acrimony and slander in the spring of 1766, Hume's first 
concern was for the consequences that Rousseau's lies might have for his reputation in 
France. He had his account of the affair published in French first. That Hume had been 
in Paris as de facto secretary to the British ambassador is evidence of the status his 
writings won for him in the British state, as is the fact that he was soon afterwards 
appointed to an important position of the Northern Department. He came to move 
easily in the highest circles, in London and abroad. Unlike most of those who took part 
in what we now call 'the Scottish Enlightenment' Hume had no investment in any of the 
institutions that had been identified at the time of the Act of Union as impossible to 
merge with their English counterparts. He never had a position of any kind in either the 
Scottish church, the Scottish universities, or the Scottish legal establishment. He showed 
little interest in the great practical projects of improvement that so concerned men like 
the Earl of Ilay, William Robertson, and Lord Kames. When an attempt was made to 
alleviate the dire financial circumstances of many of Scotland's ministers, Hume's 
response was to write a mocking pamphlet (see Stewart 1997). 
 1.2 Even so, Hume lived out of Scotland for fewer than ten years out of sixty-
five. He was educated there, and, so far as we know, did not leave the country until he 
was twenty-three. He returned to North Britain with relief in 1769, resolving never to go 
south again. All of his closest friends -- the friends to whom he wrote the most letters 
over the longest periods of time -- were Scottish. He knew almost everyone who was 
anyone in Scotland, especially in Edinburgh. He repeatedly found himself involved in 
Scottish party politics, and in a struggle between religious traditionalists and their 
modernizing antagonists. He shared drafts of his books with Scottish friends, hoping for 
comment and criticism. Some of his books seem to have grown out of papers presented 
to Scotland's numerous discussion societies. Most of his works were published in 
London, but, after the Treatise, were always printed and sold by Scottish publishers. There 
is a question to be asked, then, about the extent to which, despite his effacement of his 
Scottishness from his writings, Scotland imprinted itself on his books. This chapter 
considers some of Hume's major works with that question in mind. We begin with A 
Treatise of Human Nature. We then consider the volumes of Essays, Moral and Political 
published by Hume in the 1740s. After that we turn to Political Discourses. Next we discuss 
The History of England -- which, of course, was at first a history of Great Britain. And we 
conclude with Hume's principal writings on religion, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 
and 'The Natural History of Religion'. We make suggestions about the extent to which 
the conception and writing of each of these works might be said to have had a significant 
Scottish context. Hume cannot be turned into a Scottish philosopher and historian, 
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where 'Scottish' means 'Scottish, not British'. Even so, the fact that he was Scottish was 






2.1 The little we know about the composition of A Treatise of Human Nature suggests that 
its central idea, the idea of a new, properly 'experimental' account of human nature taken 
as a whole, took shape in Hume's mind in the wake of the sudden mental and physical 
breakdown that he suffered in 1729. In a letter written in 1751 Hume said that A Treatise 
of Human Nature was 'plan'd before I was one and twenty, & compos'd before twenty five' 
(Greig 1932: I 158). Hume turned twenty-one in April 1732. It was in 1731, so he told an 
anonymous physician in a long letter written in 1734, that he had 'resolved to make 
[human nature] my principal Study, & the source from which I wou'd derive every Truth 
in Criticism as well as Morality' (Greig 1932: I 16). It is true that in the 'Advertisement' 
attached to the posthumous 1777 edition of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 
Hume described the Treatise as 'A work which the Author had projected before he left 
College' (Hume 1777b: I [ii]), but it seems most unlikely that Hume really did have a clear 
idea of what he would attempt in the Treatise while he was still a student at Edinburgh. 
This, however, is not to say that his four years at college need be judged to have been 
completely irrelevant to its conception. The logic course that he took in his third year, 
taught by Colin Drummond, was so old-fashioned in its concentration upon scholastic 
logic and semantics (see Stewart 2005: 11-16) that it might well have provoked an 
intelligent and independent-minded student into enthusiastic acceptance of the Lockean 
philosophical revolution. It might have made it seem obvious to Hume that the proper 
task for the logician was the study of how it is that human beings actually reason. And 
the course in natural philosophy that he took in his fourth year might have inspired a 
commitment to just the kind of Boylean and Newtonian experimentalism that Hume 
deployed ostentatiously throughout the Treatise -- and that he advertised on the book's 
title-page.1 
 2.2 In the years immediately following his undergraduate studies Hume studied 
law for a time -- we now know that he attended law classes at Edinburgh (see Zachs 
2011: 59) -- but it did not suit him. His family left him free to indulge the 'passion for 
literature' that in 'My Own Life', the brief autobiography written shortly before he died, 
Hume described as 'the ruling passion of my life, and the great source of my enjoyments' 
(Hume 1777a: 4). In 1729, so he told the anonymous physician, he experienced a 
dramatic rush of self-confidence in his literary talents: 'there seem'd to be open'd up to 
me a new Scene of Thought, which transported me beyond Measure, & made me, with 
an Ardor natural to young men, throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply 
entirely to it' (Greig 1932: I 13). Norman Kemp Smith speculated that this 'new scene of 
thought' was the idea of applying to logic, the study of the understanding, the sentiment-
based theory of moral judgment developed by Francis Hutcheson (Kemp Smith 1941: 
12-20). A closer reading of the letter to the physician makes it seem, rather, that this 
                                                
1 Hume's name is on a list of students 'who contributed to the augmenting' of a 
'Physiological Library' founded by the professor of natural philosophy, Robert Steuart, in 
1724 (Anon. 1725: 8; for an analysis of the library catalogue, see Barfoot 1990). 
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moment of inspiration was a false start, that it was not until two years later that the idea 
of the Treatise came into focus, and that what animated Hume in 1731 was a conviction 
that the respect for ancient philosophy so plain in Hutcheson's works was a fertile source 
of error (see Brandt 1977). Hutcheson was surely one of those who had been 
'overthrown' by the greatness of the genius of the ancients. Hume resolved to 'throw off' 
all such 'prejudices' (Greig 1732: I 16). 
 2.3 In 1731 Hume was still living at the family home of Ninewells in Chirnside, 
close to Berwick upon Tweed and the border with England. The Borders was then, as it 
is now, a relatively sparsely populated region, but in the early 1730s it was even so the 
site of a considerable amount of philosophical activity. Henry Home of Kames had his 
own family home near to Chirnside, and doubtless spent time there while the Edinburgh 
law courts were closed. Kames had by this time had philosophical correspondence with 
Samuel Clarke and Joseph Butler, and also with another inhabitant of the Scottish 
Borders, the religious controversialist, and defender of Clarke's views, Andrew Baxter. At 
this point in his career Kames was writing a good deal more than he published, on a 
variety of subjects, in logic and metaphysics, morals, politics, and criticism. According to 
James McCosh Hume and Kames became acquainted as early as 1727 (McCosh 1875: 
174), though the earliest surviving letters are dated ten years later. It is likely that they 
were debating a wide range philosophical and literary questions between 1731 and 1734, 
while Hume 'scribled many a Quire of Paper, in which there is nothing contain'd but my 
own Inventions' (Greig 1932: I 16). Kames was the older man by fifteen years, and his 
example and his encouragement would have been important to Hume, as it was to others 
later. In 1745 Hume would tell Kames that he had always regarded him 'as the best 
Friend, in every respect, I ever possest' (Klibansky and Mossner 1954: 17). Also close by 
was the deist William Dudgeon, who on account of his State of the Moral World Consider'd 
was summoned before the presbytery of Chirnside in 1732. The case was referred up to 
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and dragged on until 1736, when it was 
finally dropped. Dudgeon was attacked in print by Baxter, and published in turn a 
vindication of his claim that when the scheme of providence is properly understood, it 
can be seen that there is no real evil in the universe, neither moral nor physical. Hume 
must have been aware of Dudgeon and of the fate of his book. In a copy of his 
Philosophical Works (1765) held by the National Library of Scotland that contains 
Dudgeon's own annotations someone wrote that 'David Hume owed many hints 
contained in his writings to Mr. Dudgeon'.2 This is not entirely plausible. Hume never 
entertained Dudgeon's kind of quasi-Spinozist metaphysics, and, Section VIII of the first 
Enquiry, explicitly criticized the kind of theodicy outlined in the State of the Moral World 
Consider'd.3 
 2.4 In so far as it is possible responsibly to form any hypothesis at all about 
Hume's intellectual influences in the early 1730s, it would seem that it was Bernard 
                                                
2 NLS [Ven].9/2 
3 There is in fact nothing very remarkable about Dudgeon's views. In many respects they 
are similar to the opinions of writers such as Hutcheson, William Leechman, and George 
Turnbull. Dudgeon's prosecution is evidence merely of the antipathy of traditionalist 
Calvinists to new styles of moral and religious thought. Claims made by Paul Russell (in 
Russell 2008: ch. 4) to the effect that the Dudgeon-Baxter debate must have been vitally 
important to Hume as he planned the Treatise depend upon the plausibility of the idea 
that Hume's principal goal in his first book was to replace the philosophy of Samuel 
Clarke with a materialist, atheistic neo-Hobbesianism. For reasons to be sceptical of this 
idea, see Harris (2009). 
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Mandeville who played the most important role. There are echoes of Mandeville in all of 
the most important surviving texts from this period: the incomplete manuscript 'An 
historical essay on chivalry and modern honour' (see Wright 2012), the letter to the 
anonymous physician (see Wright 2003), and a letter written in France from Hume to his 
friend Michael Ramsay (see Tolonen 2008). And if, as seems likely, Mandeville retained a 
hold over Hume during the composition of the Treatise, we have the beginnings of an 
explanation as to why it is impossible to locate Hume's first book in the 'providential 
naturalist' (or 'teleological naturalist') tradition identified by David Fate Norton as the 
mainstream of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophical thought (see Norton 1982: 202-
4 and passim; also Norton XXXX). Hume's Scottish contemporaries -- from Hutcheson 
and Kames through to Beattie and Reid -- understood the task of the scientist of human 
nature to be that of revealing divine wisdom and benevolence at work in the framing of 
the mind and its powers. God was believed to have had a purpose in his design of 
human nature. That is, God had an idea of human happiness and of how it was best 
achieved, and the philosopher's job was to interpret human nature as evidence of the 
creator's intentions. Conceived of this way, the science of the mind was at the same time 
a means of bolstering confidence in the reliability of our epistemic and moral faculties. 
Like Mandeville, Hume rejected this picture of philosophy altogether. Consideration of 
purposes and 'final causes' had no more place in the study of human nature than in the 
study of physical nature. The philosopher was better compared to the anatomist, who, 
when he pulled off the skin and began to cut up mussels, flesh, and organs, revealed 
things more likely to revolt than delight. Mandeville had presented himself in this way on 
the very first page of The Fable of the Bees, and Hume borrowed Mandeville's imagery in a 
letter to Hutcheson written in 1739 (Greig 1934: I 32-3), and also in the final paragraph 
of Book Three of the Treatise (Hume 1739-40: III 280-1). Hume presumably intended 
himself to be understood as doing something quite different in philosophy from what 
was being done by his Scottish contemporaries. 
 2.5 In the Introduction to the Treatise Hume located himself in an English 
tradition of 'philosophers ... who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, 
and have engaged the attention, and have engaged the curiosity of the public' (Hume 
1739-40: I 6-7). He does so again in the Abstract ... of A Treatise of Human Nature, 
published in 1740 in order to stir up interest in a book that Hume, with a first-time 
author's anxiety, was sure was not getting the attention it deserved. 'This book', the 
Abstract begins, 'seems to be wrote upon the same plan with several other works that 
have had a great vogue of late years in England' (Hume 1740: 5; italics in the original). 
Here, presumably, by 'English' and 'England' is meant 'Britain' and 'British' -- where 
'Britain' includes Ireland as well as England and Scotland. Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, 
Hutcheson and Butler are referred to in the Abstract as 'our countrymen', 'who, tho' they 
differ in many points among themselves, seem all to agree in founding their accurate 
disquisitions of human nature entirely upon experience' (Hume 1740: 7). Elsewhere in 
the Abstract, though, Hume makes it clear that he does not see his philosophy as British 
and British only. The Abstract intimates that the main contribution of the Treatise is the 
account of probabilistic reasoning developed in Part Three of Book One. It was Leibniz, 
Hume says, who, in his Théodicée, pointed out the inadequacy of what little attention had 
been given to probabilistic as opposed to demonstrative inferences. And the failing that 
Leibniz identified was a failing to be found not only in Locke, but also in Malebranche 
and in the logic of Arnauld and Nicole. The principal argument of the Treatise, in other 
words, had European significance. Hume underlines this with references elsewhere in the 
Abstract to Descartes and Cartesian doctrine. There are not many references to other 
writers in the Treatise itself, but there is a perhaps rather studied cosmopolitanism to 
mentions of Malezieu, La Rochefoucauld, Rollin and Guicciardini in addition to Berkeley, 
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Barrow, Milton and Prior. Hume intended it to make it plain that the author of the 
Treatise had read widely in French and Italian as well as in English. 
 2.6 '[W]hen St. Denis is mentioned,' Hume observes in the Abstract, 'the idea of 
Paris naturally occurs' (Hume 1740: 32). The Treatise was written in France, and Book 
One in particular seems to have been shaped by sceptical currents of thought much more 
powerful there than in Britain. It might be that Hume had been, so to speak, prepared by 
his Calvinist upbringing to find scepticism more plausible than most of his British 
contemporaries did. However, it is entirely possible that the fact that Hume went to 
France in 1734 made the Treatise a different book from what it would have been had 
Hume returned to Ninewells after his brief spell as a trainee merchant in Bristol. We 
know that Hume encountered Bayle in 1732 at the latest (see Greig 1932: I 12) -- he 
could have been lead to Bayle by Mandeville's Free Thoughts concerning Religion, Government, 
and National Happiness -- but in France he may well have read more deeply and widely in 
the modern sceptical tradition. It has been argued, for example, that Pierre Daniel Huet 
might have had a significant impact on Hume's elaboration of sceptical argumentation 
(see Broadie 2012: ch. 3). In 1745 Hume would cite 'Monsieur Huet the learned Bishop 
of Avaranches' as proof that the most extreme scepticism was perfectly compatible with 
the deepest piety (Hume 1745: 20-1). There are, moreover, several places in Books One 
and Two of the Treatise which evince serious, and of course sceptical, engagement with 
the philosophy of Malebranche. In fact, considered under its sceptical rather than under 
its 'naturalistic' aspect, the Treatise reads like nothing so much as a pitting of modern 
French Pyrrhonism against modern French metaphysics.  
 2.7  It might be thought that Hume returns to distinctively British concerns at the 
beginning of Book Three, with its rehearsal of the debate between rationalist and 
sentimentalist theories of the foundations of morals. It might also be thought that Hume 
adopts a distinctively Scottish position with respect to that debate, in so far as he 
reiterates Hutcheson's arguments against rationalism, and presents himself as one of 
those who holds that moral distinctions are 'deriv'd from a moral sense', and that 
'[m]orality ... is more properly felt than judg'd of' (Hume 1739-40: III 26). On David 
Norton's reading of Hume, for instance, the gap between Hume and his Scottish 
contemporaries -- certainly the gap between Hume and Hutcheson -- is considerably 
narrower in Book Three than in Books One and Two of the Treatise (see Norton 1982: 
ch. 3). And Kemp Smith read Hume as having accepted wholesale Hutchesonian 
sentimentalism (see Kemp Smith 1941: 23-44). It is easy, though, to exaggerate the 
significance of Part One of Book Three when it comes to the understanding of the 
overall thrust of Hume's moral philosophy. It has been suggested, in fact (by James 
Moore: see Moore 1994: 38-9), that Part One was a late addition to the argument, an 
addition made after Hume had received Hutcheson's comments on his scheme of the 
virtues in (what would be published as) Parts Two and Three. On this interpretation, 
starting a book of moral philosophy with an adoption of sentimentalism was in essence a 
way of pre-empting criticism that was bound be excited by the subsequent argument that 
justice and promise-keeping are 'artificial' and not 'natural' virtues. It enabled Hume to 
pretend that he was doing no more than drawing out implications of the Hutchesonian 
view -- when in truth he was presenting an aggressive, and distinctively Mandevillean, 
challenge to Hutcheson's conception of the nature of the distinction between virtue and 
vice. Moore thus sees Book Three as no less indebted to French thought -- in this 
instance, to French neo-Epicureanism, as channeled by Mandeville -- in Book Three than 
in Books One and Two (see Moore 1994: 27-29 and passim; see also Tolonen 2013). 
 2.8 Hutcheson was among those to whom Hume sent copies of Books One and 
Two of the Treatise. In a letter to Kames, Hutcheson declared himself 'every where 
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surprised with a great acuteness of thought and reasoning in a mind wholly disengaged 
from the prejudices of the Learned as well as those of the Vulgar' (Ross 1966: 71). But 
even this early in his career Hume was not writing with only a local Scottish audience in 
mind. Copies were also sent, for example, to Butler and to Pope. Hume seems to have 
been especially concerned to know what Pierre Desmaizeaux thought of the Treatise. 
'Have you found it sufficiently intelligible?' Hume asked. 'Does it appear true to you? Do 
the Style & Language seem tolerable?' (Greig 1932: I 29). Desmaizeaux, editor of Bayle, 
editor also of the Bibliothèque raisonée des ouvrages des savans de l'Europe, was a conduit 
whereby Hume might make himself known to the larger pan-European republic of 
letters. By the middle of the 1740s, when Hume had given up on the Treatise and on the 
initial idea of adding to it treatments of criticism and politics, when he was thinking 
afresh about how to present his philosophical ideas to the public, intelligibility and style 
and language remained as important as truth. It is conceivable that the way his ideas were 
misrepresented when he was put forward for the Edinburgh moral philosophy chair in 
1744-5 (see below, Section 6 of the present chapter) helped shape the new presentation 
of those ideas in Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding (later re-titled An 
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding) (see Stewart 2002). Hume saw that he needed to 
be clearer about the nature of his scepticism, and clearer, in particular, about the fact that 
it was not meant to discredit the beliefs of common life. But the Philosophical Essays were 
no more aimed at a purely Scottish audience than the Treatise had been. They were a 
determined bid for recognition from all of those who admired the style of Cicero, La 
Bruyère and Addison as much as they did the philosophical penetration of Malebranche 
and Locke. The Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals relegated to an appendix the 
British debate between rationalists and sentimentalists. It also downplayed its author's 
debts to Mandeville. It was organised instead around a question -- concerning the role of 
the utile and the dulce in moral judgment -- that had been given canonical form by Cicero 






3.1 In the summer of 1739 Hume was exchanging 'papers' with Kames, at least some of 
which later appeared in the two volumes of Essays, Moral and Political that Hume 
published in 1741 and 1742 (Greig 1932: I 30-31). In the Advertisement to the first 
volume Hume related that most of the essays 'were wrote with a View of being publish'd 
as WEEKLY-PAPERS' (Hume 1741: iii). It is sometimes speculated (see e.g. Ross 1972: 81; 
Emerson 2008: 10) that Hume and Kames were planning a new journal together. Earlier 
Edinburgh publishing ventures like The Echo: or, Edinburgh Weekly Journal (which had run 
from 1729 to 1732), The Reveur (which had run between November 1737 and May 1738) 
and Letters of the Critical Club (which had run from January to June 1738, and may have 
been partly written by Kames) had made it clear that there was a Scottish appetite and 
market for such journals. They were in some respects imitations of London-based 
publications like The Gentleman's Magazine, and in others owed much to the example 
Addison and Steele's Tatler and Spectator. They eschewed theological and political 
controversy, or at least claimed to do so, and made a show of, like Addison and Steele, 
concentrating instead on manners, morals, and taste. Several of Hume's essays are in a 
similar idiom, with similar preoccupations. And some of them show signs of being 
written with a specifically Scottish audience in mind. There is at one point a humorous 
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reference to 'our Scottish ladies', and when Hume mentions a famous miser in 'this city', 
he means Edinburgh (Hume 1741: 63, 155). These essays of Hume's are evidence that by 
the fourth decade of the century the witty, elegant, reflective language of the Tatler and 
Spectator could not possibly be regarded as an alien, Anglicizing imposition -- and they are 
evidence also that Hume was as interested as anyone in Scotland in showing that 
'politeness' was as much at home in Edinburgh as it was in London (see Phillipson 1975). 
 3.2 Hume's took as the model for his essays Bolingbroke's Craftsman as well as 
Addison and Steele's Spectator (Hume 1741: iii). The majority of the pieces collected in the 
first volume of Essays, Moral and Political addressed political questions. Like many other 
writers on politics at the time, including Bolingbroke of course, Hume was especially 
concerned with the factionalized state of British political life, and he carefully cultivated 
an balanced and non-partisan approach to the issues of the day, seeking to lower the 
political temperament by bringing out the respects in which the Whig government and its 
opposition critics were in agreement with each other. All of the political topics that 
Hume discussed in the Essays necessarily had at their heart the question of whether the 
style of parliamentary management very successfully developed by Robert Walpole 
amounted to a corruption of the constitution and a subversion of British liberty. Hume 
thought not. He argued, against Bolingbroke, that the stability of the British polity 
depended upon strong executive power, and that Walpole's showering of places and 
pensions upon Members of Parliament was in principle (though not always in practice) a 
justifiable means of countering what would otherwise be an overwhelmingly strong 
House of Commons. Preserving the settlement that had followed the Revolution of 1688 
required a powerful, centralized, state apparatus. This was a position that had 
implications in the Scottish context. It amounted to support for the powerful regime of 
crown patronage managed for Walpole by Archibald Campbell, Earl of Ilay (see 
Emerson 2013: ch. 14).4 Even while Hume appeared in his political essays to be 
discussing Westminster matters, he was at the same time inserting himself into the local 
Scottish debate between Ilay and his opponents.   
 3.3 At the end of the essay 'Of the Parties of Great-Britain' Hume turned from 
the analysis of Britain taken as a whole to the case of Scotland in particular. The main 
argument of this essay is that the real distinction between Whig and Tory had not, as 
Bolingbroke claimed it had, been lost in 1688. The essence of the distinction was a 
disagreement about the relative importance of liberty and monarchy combined with a  
difference of views about the settlement of the crown, whether on the House of 
Hanover or the House of Stuart. The two party positions Hume took to be 'accidental, 
but natural Additions to the Principles of the Court and Country Parties, which are the 
genuine Parties of the British Government' (Hume 1741: 134). England and Scotland 
differed, however, in that 'we never had any Tories in Scotland, according to the proper 
Signification of the Word, and that the Division of Parties in this Country was really into 
Whigs and Jacobites' (Hume 1741: 138). The difference between a Tory and a Jacobite was 
that the latter had no regard at all for liberty and the constitution, and was either in 
favour of absolute monarchy, or was at least willing to sacrifice all of the 1688 settlement 
to ensure a Stuart succession. And what had made Jacobitism a force to be reckoned 
with in the earlier part of the century was the way its flames had been fanned by 
episcopalian clergy who had all been turned out of their churches after the Revolution 
                                                
4 Hume sent Ilay (since 1743 the third duke of Argyll) a copy of the 1748 edition of 
Essays, Moral and Political. It was a present, he said, 'not to the Duke of Argyle, but to 
Archibald Campbell, who is undoubtedly a Man of Sense and Learning' (Greig 1932: I 
113). 
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and so had no reason to make any kind of compromise with the new regime. But now, 
Hume claimed, Jacobitism was a spent force, which, in the absence of a Tory party, 
meant that Scotland's politics were entirely determined by the natural distinction between 
the parties of court and of country, a distinction which, Hume claimed, was still 'but 
creeping in at London' (Hume 1741: 139). There was, moreover, a further reason for the 
absence of a Tory-Whig divide in Scotland. In North Britain there were only two social 
ranks, the wealthy and educated on the one hand, and the mean and slaving poor on the 
other. There was no 'middling rank of men', as in England, neither in the cities nor in the 
country. The middling rank, according to Hume, 'have Curiosity and Knowledge enough 
to form Principles, but not enough to form true Ones, or correct any Prejudices that they 
may have imbib'd' -- 'And 'tis among the middling Rank of People, that Tory Principles 
do at present prevail most in England' (Hume 1741: 139-40). 
 3.4 Hume was interested enough in Scotland to point out these differences from 
England, but did not discern the real significance of the fact that Scotland lacked a 
sizeable class of people of the middle rank. Four years after Hume claimed that 'the 
Jacobite Party is almost entirely vanish'd from among us' Charles Edward Stuart landed on 
the west coast of Scotland, gathered an army, quickly took control of Edinburgh, and 
then marched south into England to get within a hundred miles of the capital. It was 
among the wealthy and the slaving poor that Charles found most of his supporters. 
Hume was out of Scotland for most of the '45, employed as tutor to the marquess of 
Annandale at Weld Hall near St. Albans, and does not discuss it in his letters. He had his 
say about it though, in a pamphlet written to defend his friend Archibald Stewart from 
the charge that as provost of Edinburgh in 1745 he had failed to be sufficiently stalwart 
in the measures he took to defend the city from the Jacobite army. In the event, charges 
against Stewart were dropped before Hume's pamphlet could be published, but Hume 
put it out anyway. A True Account of the Behaviour of Archibald Stewart makes plain Hume's 
complete lack of sympathy for the Jacobite cause, and for the situation of Highland 
Scotland more generally. Had the rebels prevailed, he wrote, Britain would have been 
'reduced to Slavery' (Box, Harvey, and Silverthorne 2003: 237). That this nearly happened 
was due to the fact that the civilized part of the country -- meaning Lowland Scotland 
and England -- had lost the habit of the use of arms, while 'the barbarous Highlander' 
still cultivated ideas of military honour and valued courage in battle above all else. 
Hume's pamphlet strongly suggests that he thought it was right that the British state took 
full and violent revenge on the regions that had given Charles Edward most support. 
When civilization was threatened by barbarism, Hume was absolutely sure which side he 
was on.  
 3.5 The same scepticism about the supposed virtues of an uncorrupted and 
martial Scotland was on display when, twenty years later, Hume was faced with the 
poems that James Macpherson claimed were English translations of an ancient epic 
poems in Gaelic by 'Ossian son of Fingal'. Having initially been willing to take 
Macpherson at his word (see Greig 1932: I 328-31, and Raynor 1991), Hume came to 
find it impossible, in the absence of any positive evidence to the contrary, not to believe 
that all the poems were forgeries. In the early 1770s he laid out the reasons for doubt in 
an unpublished paper that may have been intended for presentation at a discussion 
society.5 Part of that paper was then used in a letter to Gibbon. 'It is, indeed, strange,' he 
told the author of the Decline and Fall, 'that any men of Sense coud have imagin'd it 
possible, that above twenty thousand Verses, along with numberless historical Facts, 
could have been preservd by oral Tradition during fifty Generations, by the rudest, 
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perhaps, of all European Nations; the most necessitous; the most turbulent, and the 
most unsettled' (Greig 1932: II 310). Those who clung to the idea of the authenticity of 
Macpherson's publications did so because they wanted it to be true that the poems 
testified to something eternal in the Scottish character. Here was an idea of Scottishness 
that differentiated Scotland from England, indeed from the rest of Europe, and that 
suggested that Scots had the resources whereby to preserve an essential strength and 
virtue in the face of the effeminacy and luxury of modern civilization. Hume did not 
value that idea of Scottishness. Though a member of the club, the Poker, formed to 
agitate for a Scottish militia, Hume had no real interest in preserving the military spirit 
among his countrymen (see Robertson 1985: 237-43).6 And when Adam Ferguson 
published An Essay on Civil Society in 1767, with its passionate case for the ancient virtues 
of simplicity and martial valour as antidotes to modern corruption, Hume was privately 
very disappointed in his friend. He asked Elizabeth Montagu whether the Essay 'did not 
savour somewhat of the country': 'Oh yes, said she, a great deal: it seems almost 
impossible that anyone could write such a style except a Scotchman' (Greig 1932: II 131-
2). This was exactly what was wrong with it. It was Scottish, not British. 
 3.6 As Hume saw it, both Ferguson and those who clung to the authenticity of 
the Ossianic poems were nostalgists who were failing to face up to political reality, and 
who were mistaken as to the nature of the situation that Scotland had to deal with in the 
second half of the eighteenth century. The defeat of Charles Edward's army at Culloden 
should have been taken as evidence that there was nothing worth preserving in the 
values and ideals of Scotland's distant past. The real issue for Scots was not to be framed 
in terms of the tension between those ideals and modern, British, commerce and 
'corruption', but rather in terms of what the character would be of the Whig political 
culture that was bound to dominate Scotland for the foreseeable future. This was the 
issue that the trial of Archibald Stewart had brought into focus. It had been Whigs who 
had wanted Stewart's disgrace -- and of course Stewart himself was a Whig too. But, 
Hume explained in a Postscript to his pamphlet defending Stewart, there was a crucial 
difference between 'religious Whigs' and 'political Whigs'. A political Whig was 'a Man of 
Sense and Moderation, a Lover of Laws and Liberty, whose chief Regard to particular 
Princes and Families, is founded on a Regard to the publick Good' (Box, Harvey, and 
Silverthorne 2003: 251). A religious Whig, by contrast, was motivated most strongly by 
an antipathy to bishops and the Book of Common Prayer, and his religious zeal was all 
too likely to issue in 'Dissimulation, Hypocrisy, Violence, Calumny [and] Selfishness' 
((Box, Harvey, and Silverthorne 2003: 252). Stewart's trial had been a return to the 
madness and bitterness of the seventeenth century, when Scottish Protestantism had 
torn itself, and the country, apart over what Hume regarded as trivial and unsettlable 
questions of dogma and ceremony. What was most necessary after the defeat of the 
Jacobites was that this history not be allowed to repeat itself. Political Whiggism, with its 
pragmatic focus on the public good, had to prevail over those willing to use the rebellion 
as an excuse to return to the religious disagreements of the past. 
                                                
6 The fact that Hume found a place for a militia in his design for a perfect 
commonwealth (see Hume 1752: 291) had no implications for the question of whether it 
was sensible to allow militias in Scotland barely more than a decade after the Jacobite 
rebellion. It was true that, as Hume put it, 'without a militia, 'tis folly to think any free 
government will ever have security or stability' (Hume 1752: 298) -- but Britain was a 
monarchy, albeit a limited one, not a free government in the republican sense of the 
word 'free'. 
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 3.7 The question of the form Whiggism that should take remained firmly in 
Hume's sights in three essays that he wrote in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion. 
They were intended to be published together as a small book, and to be added also to the 
new edition of Essays, Moral and Political that would be published in 1748. These were 'Of 
Passive Obedience', 'Of the Original Contract', and 'Of the Protestant Succession'. They 
can be understood as Hume's response to the '45. In the six pages of 'Of Passive 
Obedience' he provided a summary and brutally efficient demolition of the key political 
principle of Jacobitism. 'Of the Original Contract' was much longer, and much more 
carefully argued, but it was also a work of demolition. It did fatal damage to the idea that 
the origin of the duty of allegiance lay in a contract between the sovereign and the people 
-- an idea which had the corollary that when the contract was violated by the sovereign, 
the duty of allegiance no longer obtained, and the people had a right to resist and to 
replace the sovereign with a new government of their choosing. After 1688 Whiggism 
had had to reconfigure itself, and turn itself from an oppositional doctrine into the 
ideology of an apparently permanent party of government. But what, then, should be the 
principles of the new style of Whiggism? What was its philosophical foundation? This 
was the question that Hume addressed in 'Of the Protestant Succession'. And the answer 
was that Whiggism -- political Whiggism -- had in fact no foundation deeper than regard 
for the public good. Nothing had happened in 1688 or since that had instantly deprived 
the Stuart line of legitimacy and conferred it instead and William of Orange and his 
successors. The '45 had raised the question of whether George II really did have a title to 
the British crown. It was not completely obvious that he did. There was still something 
to be said for the Stuarts and the principle of hereditary succession. The only way of 
settling the matter lay in considering whether Hanoverian government was proving good 
for the country, whether it was (mostly) preserving peace and order, and allowing Britain 
to prosper. These were the terms in which Whigs needed to be thinking -- especially, 
perhaps, in Scotland, where religion was still likely to distract Whigs from the questions 
that mattered.  
3.8 Hume told Kames that he treated the subject of the Hanoverian succession 
'as coolly and indifferently, as I would the dispute betwixt Caesar and Pompey. The 
conclusion shows me a Whig, but a very sceptical one' (Greig 1732: I 111). Hume was 
persuaded by his friends in Scotland that sceptical Whiggism was not what was called for 
in a Britain still reeling from the Jacobite incursion. Sceptical Whiggism was too likely to 
sound like no Whiggism at all. At the time the Hanoverian succession expected more 
robust support than this essay provided. So Hume held it back -- it was published four 
years later in Political Discourses -- and wrote a new essay to be published with 'Of Passive 
Obedience' and 'Of the Original Contract'. This was 'Of National Characters'. It was 
written while Hume was in Turin as secretary to a diplomatic mission led by General St. 
Clair. Hume says little about Scotland in the course of his argument that national 
character is determined by 'moral' and not by 'physical' causes. The only reference to 
Scotland is by way of comparison and contrast with the 'wonderful Mixture of Manners 
and Character' observable in England. The implication is that Scotland is much more 
typical: it has a definite national character, unspecified by Hume, while 'the English, of 
any People in the Universe, have the least of a national Character; unless this very 
Singularity be made their national Character' (Hume 1748: 15-17). In a discussion of the 
differences between northern and southern peoples, Hume gave further evidence of his 
inability to believe in the moral superiority of simpler, less civilized peoples. Thus the 
fact that it is usually northern nations that conquer southern ones, and not vice versa, 
was characterized as being mostly a matter of poverty and want triumphing over plenty 
and riches. 'Of National Characters' was much criticized because of a footnote on the 
character of the priestly profession. Mossner claims that this was a covert attack on 
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Scotland in particular (Mossner 1980: 234), but it might just have well been prompted by 






4.1 Among those who took exception to the footnote attacking priests in 'Of National 
Characters' was Robert Wallace, an Edinburgh minister, and leader of the Church of 
Scotland in the early 1740s. Among Wallace's unpublished papers is a comprehensive 
reply to Hume vindicating the priestly profession.7 Wallace, however, was no unthinking 
bigot. He had been a founder member of the Rankenian Society, and was a member of 
Edinburgh's Philosophical Society. An opponent of the Argyll interest in Scottish affairs, 
he devoted himself largely to scholarship after the Duke of Ilay rose to preeminence in 
the wake of the '45, and in the mid-to-late 1740s he read to the Philosophical Society a 
Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in Antient and Modern Times. Wallace's position -- in 
large part a critique of Mandeville -- was that the population of the ancient world had 
been considerably greater than that of the modern, and that the explanation of the 
decline in the number of human beings was to be found in the corruption of manners 
and morals. During a two-year period spent at Ninewells between 1749 and 1751 Hume 
developed a contrary line of argument in his essay 'Of the Populousness of Antient 
Nations'. Hume read and corrected the manuscript of Wallace's Dissertation before the 
essay was published in Political Discourses in 1752, and their subsequent correspondence 
about population and other issues was for Hume a model of how enlightened men of 
letters should treat each other (see Klibansky and Mossner 1954: 28-35, and Mossner 
1943: XXX-XXX). He made a point of acknowledging Wallace's 'erudition' and 'good 
reasoning' in a footnote at the beginning of the essay (Hume 1752: 155). Wallace, in turn, 
when he published the Dissertation in 1753, added to it a long Appendix subjecting 
Hume's essay to rigorous yet respectful criticism.8 Nor was Wallace the only Scot with 
whom Hume could differ profoundly and yet maintain friendly relations. When James 
Balfour criticized Hume's moral philosophy in his 1753 Delineation of Nature and Obligation 
of Morality, Hume wrote to him imagining that they might 'revive the happy times, when 
Atticius and Cassius the Epicureans, Cicero the Academic, and Brutus the Stoic, could, 
all of them, live in unreserved friendship together, and were insensible to all those 
distinctions, except so far as they furnished agreeable matter to discourse and 
conversation' (Greig 1932: I 173). 
 4.2 Discourse and conversation with his Scottish contemporaries was important 
to Hume. The Treatise was the only one of his works composed in intellectual and social 
isolation. The political economy contained in Political Discourses was talked through with 
James Oswald of Dunnikier -- and no doubt with Kames as well. In October 1750 
Oswald wrote to Hume with some critical comments on the argument of a draft of the 
                                                
7 'Letter from a Moderate Freethinker' 
8 It is possible that Hume also discussed the argument of 'Of Miracles' with Wallace. 
Among Wallace's papers is a set of 'Observations on the Account of the Miracles of the 
Abbé de Paris'. XXX? 
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essay 'Of the Balance of Trade'.9 These comments put pressure in particular on the 
scepticism expressed in that essay about the capacity of a rich country permanently to 
maintain its advantages over a poor country. Oswald was much more confident than 
Hume in a rich country's ability to rely on, especially, its capacity to buy and store cheap 
food in times of abundance, and to attract skilled workers. Oswald's letter seems to have 
been important to the final published form of 'Of the Balance of Trade'. Hume may have 
also found helpful the discussion -- initiated by Adam Smith -- of some of his 'Essays on 
Commerce' at the Literary Society of Glasgow in January 1752. There is some reason to 
think that the point of the title 'Political Discourses' was to draw attention to the fact that 
the essays the book contained presented their subject matter in a discursive manner, that is, 
in a manner intended to provoke further discussion. Many if not all of the questions 
raised in Political Discourses were already subjects of conversation in Scotland in the late 
1740s and early 1750s. 
 4.3 Political Discourses, like the first editions of the Essays, Moral and Political, was 
published in Edinburgh. Roger Emerson has claimed that in fact Hume had a 
distinctively Scottish agenda in his writings on economics -- that he 'had Scots in mind 
for significant portions of his theoretical analyses and policy recommendations' 
(Emerson 2008: 10). A direct consequence of the '45 was that the issue of the economic 
development of the Highlands had at last become a pressing issue for Lowland Scots. It 
was felt that punitive and negative measures, such as the disarming of the Highlanders, 
and the abolition of military tenures and hereditary jurisdictions, were not enough to 
ensure the extinction of the Jacobite threat. Only if the Highlands were fully integrated 
with the rest of Scotland, and made equally able to benefit from the Act of Union, would 
the Highlanders come to feel, like the Lowlanders, that their interests lay in the 
preservation of the Hanoverian succession. The Highlands had to be pulled forward out 
of the age of feudalism and into the age of commerce. It may have been, then, that in 'Of 
Commerce' and 'Of Luxury' (later retitled 'Of Refinement in the Arts') Hume was 
addressing those of his fellow Scots who worried about the effects of such a process of 
modernization on manners and morals. It was not only Jacobites who had such worries. 
Men like Wallace, who had staunchly defended the Hanoverian cause in 1745, had them 
too.10 Of course this was not the only thing Hume was doing in these essays. More than 
ever in Political Discourses he had a pan-European audience in mind. But he would have 
known that this was a question that had especial resonance in Scotland in the early 1750s. 
Thus, as George Caffentzis has noted, in 1752, the year when Political Discourses was 
published, a third of the land of the Highlands was annexed by the Crown to be sold at 
public auction, with the provision that rent and profits were to be used for the purposes 
of 'civilizing' both the inhabitants of the land and those living in other parts of the 
Highlands and Islands of Scotland (see Caffentzis 2001: 312).  
 4.4 Caffentzis has suggested that Political Discourses presented the Commissioners 
of the Annexing Act with, in effect, an 'agenda for social reconstruction' in the Highlands 
that ranged 'from the material foundations to the demography to the political 
superstructure' (Caffentzis 2001: 313). The essay 'Of the Protestant Succession' spoke to 
the issue of the political superstructure. 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' forged 
a connection between increase in the world's population with the spread of modern ideas 
of liberty. One of the things, Hume argued, that spoke against the view defended by 
Wallace was the prevalence of slavery in the ancient world. And crucial to the material 
                                                
9 For the full text of Oswald's letter, see XXX; an abbreviated version is printed in 
Rotwein 19XX: 190-96. 
10 Though Wallace's Address to the Jacobites in Scotland XXX 
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foundations of economic progress was money. Hume is well known for having argued in 
his essay 'Of Money' that the absolute quantity of money in a nation's economy is 
irrelevant to its prosperity. But he also held -- and had articulated in his correspondence 
with Oswald (see Greig 1932: 143) -- the view that a steady increase in the supply of 
money is essential to growth. By this means the magistrate 'keeps a spirit of industry alive 
in the nation, and encreases the stock of labour, wherein consists all real power and 
riches' (Hume 1752: 51-59). Hume was serious in his claim that the 'stock of labour' -- 
along with appetite for work, and skills in agriculture and manufacturing trade -- was 
what mattered most. In 'Of Money' he argued that poverty prevailed in 'some kingdoms, 
and many provinces in Europe' not because money was in short supply, but because of 
'the manners and customs of the inhabitants'. Scarcity of money by itself was an 
irrelevance. It was not the cause of poverty, but rather one of poverty's collateral effects. 
Where there was vigorous economic activity, money was bound to circulate more quickly 
and more extensively, generating in turn yet more economic activity. In a region like the 
Highlands, however the question was how the spirit of industry was to be released and 
set to work. There were those in Scotland who thought -- as the Scottish political 
economist John Law had argued earlier in the century -- that banks and paper money had 
a crucial role to play here. Hume was at first extremely sceptical in this regard, arguing 
that, while in theory it did not matter what was used as money to facilitate exchange, in 
practice there reasons to be wary of  'those institutions of banks, funds, and paper credit, 
with which we are in this kingdom so infatuated' (Hume 1752: 89). They were one sure 
means of 'sinking money below its level'. As time passed, however, Hume's hostility to 
banks and paper credit weakened. By 1764 he was willing to accept that 'a right use of 
paper money' might succeed in producing an 'encrease of industry and of credit' (Hume 
1764: I 351). Caffentzis suggests that what was responsible for this change of heart was 
'the gradual dominance of paper in most transactions in Scotland and the tremendous 
growth of the Scottish economy based on the international tobacco boom, the increased 
prices for cattle, and the intensifying productivity of the linen trade' (Caffentzis 2001: 
322). 
 4.5 Was Scotland's developing economy evidence that it had sufficient people 
and skills and enterprise to overcome the inequality apparently inherent in its relations 
with England? As we have seen, Hume, unlike Oswald, did not believe that a rich 
country could maintain its advantages indefinitely. In 'Of Money' he argued that there 
was hope for a poor country, at least in the short to medium term, in the cheapness of its 
labour. 'Manufactures, therefore,' Hume claimed, 'gradually shift their places, leaving 
those countries and provinces, which they have already enrich'd, and flying to others, 
whither they are allur'd by the cheapness of provisions and labour; till they have enrich'd 
these also, and are again banish'd by the same cause' (Hume 1752: 43). Istvan Hont has 
drawn attention to the significance of this line of argument for all the political 
economists of the Scottish Enlightenment (see Hont 2005: 267-322). Hume reaffirmed it 
in debate with Josiah Tucker in 1758. In a letter to Kames Hume made it clear that he 
did not see Scotland as being in direct economic competition with England. The 
question was how Scotland might 'share [with England] in wealth and industry'. And, so 
he told Kames, he was glad to be able to indulge himself in hopes that Scotland 
possessed 'some advantages' that may enable it do so. Scotland should devote itself at 
first to 'the simpler kind of industry'. There was no reason to think that England would 
ever be able to 'annihilate or oppress' Scotland's commerce in the provisions it was 
naturally fitted to produce (Greig 1932: I 271).  
 4.6 Hont has underlined the fact that Hume's pessimism about the ability of a 
rich country like England to maintain its position indefinitely expressed itself in the 
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language of traditional civic humanism. Hume was prepared to talk in terms of 'a happy 
concurrence of causes in human affairs, which check the growth of trade and riches, and 
hinder them from being confin'd entirely to one people' (Hume 1752: 43), thus 
apparently endorsing the idea that countries, like human beings, have a natural lifespan, 
and are bound in the end to decay and die. Hume did not accept that it was wealth and 
luxury that were responsible for the fatal weakening of a country that had achieved 
greatness, but he came close enough to that way of thinking to be attacked for his 
'historical pessimism' by none other than Wallace, in his Characteristics of the Present Political 
State of Great Britain, published in 1758 as a rebuttal of John Brown's Estimate of the 
Manners and Principles of the Times (see Hont 2005: 289-91). Wallace also criticized Hume's 
reluctance to endorse banks and paper money as a means of helping Scotland toward 
prosperity. It may have been in order to clarify his understanding of the future of rich 
countries, and to distance himself from people like Brown, that Hume wrote a new essay, 
'Of the Jealousy of Trade', for the 1758 edition of Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. 
This essay reads more like a lesson for England than a lesson for Scotland. Its argument 
is 'that the increase of riches in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes 
the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a state can scarcely carry its trade 
and industry very far, where all the surrounding states are buried in ignorance, sloth, and 
barbarism' (Hume 1764: I 361). It is an invaluable resource for those who believe that 
Hume is best characterised as an essentially cosmopolitan political thinker. It sees Hume 
pursue his project of reducing the usual antipathy of the English for France. It is a British 
subject, Hume says in conclusion, that he 'pray[s] for the flourishing commerce of 
GERMANY, SPAIN, ITALY, and even FRANCE itself' (Hume 1764: I 365). Hume was not 
the only Briton arguing against the idea that trade is a zero-sum game and that France's 
gains must be England's losses. Tucker was another. Even so it has been argued -- by 
Duncan Forbes -- that there is a close connection between Hume's cosmopolitanism and 
his Scottishness. Cosmopolitanism, according to Forbes, 'is a feature of the Scottish 
mind and Scottish civilization that the Englishman never fully grasps'; it prompted to 
Hume always to be concerned with English politics, and English history, 'in the context 
of a wider European experience and from a metropolitan point of view' (Forbes 1963: 
282; see also Forbes 1978). The idea here, presumably, is that it was being Scottish that 
gave Hume his detached and nonpartisan perspective on England and its prospects.  
4.7 As Forbes is aware, Hume had an equally detached perspective on Scotland 
itself. His Scottishness was forward-looking, and, as we will see in the next section of this 
chapter, was untainted by sentimentality about the past. Hume believed in progress to 
the extent that he was prepared to accept that the modern world was, politically speaking, 
preferable to the ancient. The great achievement of modern world was the rule of law -- 
and Hume was certainly cosmopolitan enough to believe that it was not in eighteenth-
century England that the conditions of the possibility of the rule of law had been 
revealed for the first time. The 'civilized monarchies' of Europe had developed to a point 
where, de facto, the rule of law coexisted with absolute monarchical power. In the modern 
world the form of government did not matter very much, if at all. This complete lack of 
sympathy for those who dreamed of a return to the republicanism of the ancient world 
makes it hard to understand why Hume closed Political Discourses with an update of James 
Harrington's description of the ideal republic in Oceana. There are in fact two puzzles 
here. The first is why Hume was at all interested in the question of what the 'most 
perfect' form of government might be, and the second is why he gave that question a 
republican answer.  
4.8 John Robertson has argued that 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth' is to be 
understood as a 'model', as a standard to direct legislative reform. He has argued also that 
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the essay is best read as an engagement on Hume's part with the republicanism, not of 
Harrington, but rather of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun (see Robertson 1983). Fletcher, on 
Robertson's reading, sought to answer precisely the questions we have seen Hume 
address in the present section of this essay. He was worried about Scotland's poverty, 
and its dependence on England in the context of a union of the two nations, and, in An 
Account of a Conversation concerning a Right Regulation of Governments for the Common Good of 
Mankind, published in 1704, had proposed a new model of the European state system 
such as would protect Scotland's freedom. But the spirit of Fletcher's republicanism was 
taken from the ancient world. Hume's model for reform, by contrast, was 'a projection 
into the future' (Robertson 1983: 175), an argument that Fletcher was wrong in his 
conviction that commerce was of its nature a threat to liberty. More precisely, according 
to Robertson, it was an argument that a modern commercial state had the potential to 
realise not just liberty in the form the rule of law, but also a more active and 'civic' mode 
of self-government. Robertson admits, however, that it is not obvious that Hume was 
really optimistic to enough to believe that Britain would ever become something 
approximating to a perfect commonwealth. His view seems usually to have been that, 
one way or another, Britain, meaning both Scotland and England, was on the way toward 
becoming an absolutist monarchy. Such was the argument of the 1741 essay 'Whether 
the British Government inclines more to absolute Monarchy, or to a Republick', and 
such also are the sentiments of letters -- to which we will return below -- written in the 






5.1 Commentary on Hume's History has tended to focus upon its dismantling of the 
favourite myths of English Whiggism. Prominent among these were the notions of an 
Anglo-Saxon government in which power was shared between crown, nobility, and 
commons, of an enduring common law tradition which survived the Norman invasion 
(meaning that it was not proper to speak in terms of a Norman conquest), of the 
recognition by the crown of a rightful and traditional place for the commons in 
parliament as early as 1265, and of the late Tudor period as having seen a full flowering 
of English liberty which the Stuarts subverted and which the Revolution of 1688 restored. 
Work by Forbes, Phillipson, Pocock, and others has detailed the damage done by Hume 
to the possibility of using English history for Whig political purposes (see especially 
Forbes 1975, Phillipson 2011, Pocock 2000). Yet, as Colin Kidd has made clear (see 
Kidd 1993), there was such a thing as Scottish version of Whig history as well, a reading 
of Scottish history premised on a distinctively Scottish version of the idea of an ancient 
constitution with an enduring political significance for later times. According to 
sixteenth-century opponents of royal absolutism such as George Buchanan, the 
traditional Scottish model of government was that of a monarchy limited by a 
combination of the nobility and the clan chiefs. In the seventeenth century Scottish 
Whiggism developed out of the belief that this model had been disastrously upset by the 
1603 Union of the Crowns. The continuous violence of the seventeenth century had 
been the result of the fact that, with the king and court moved south to London, the 
constitution had lost its balance. There was no longer constraint on either the rapacity of 
the nobility or the disorderliness of the people. Nor was there confidence that Scotland's 
Presbyterian national church was safe from the increasingly Erastian religious policy of 
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the Stuarts. The solution to these problems, Scottish Whigs claimed, lay in a union of 
parliaments, and a constitutional framework that would return Scotland to the rule of law, 
and also provide a guarantee of her autonomy in matters of religion. Andrew Fletcher's 
republicanism was born of his dissatisfaction with this case for a union of parliaments. 
He did not believe in the version of Scottish history on which it was based, and held that 
it was necessary to look further afield for the right political model for a modern Scotland. 
Debate about the Whig version of Scottish history continued after the 1707 Act of 
Union, and can be assumed to have been one of the contexts, at least, for the History that 
Hume published between 1754 and 1762. 
 5.2 Hume first conceived of himself as writing a history of Great Britain. This 
history would begin in 1603 and would end, perhaps, with the Hanoverian succession in 
1714. It would be, necessarily, a history of Scotland as well as a history of England. And 
the existence of Scottish form of Whiggism meant that the decision to start in 1603 
would be as significant in North Britain as in South. The implication was that on neither 
side of the Tweed was there a need to begin with an account of time-honoured liberties 
put in danger by the unbridled extension of royal prerogative pursued by James I and 
Charles I. The eventual resolution of the great crisis of the seventeenth century was no 
more in Scotland than it was in England a matter of the recovery of freedoms that had 
existed in the past. On the contrary, so the logic of Hume's historical argument dictated, 
the system of liberty implemented in the wake of 1688 was completely new. It was a 
corollary of the argument that the disorder in Scotland after 1603 was not, as the Whigs 
would have it, caused by the Union of the Crowns. It was, rather, endemic to Scottish 
society as such. Hume confirmed this view of Scotland in the volumes of the History of 
England on the Tudor period. Prior to the seventeenth century, he asserted there, 
Scotland was barely a state at all. It was 'rather to be considered as confederacy, and that 
not a close one, of petty princes, than a regular system of civil polity' (Hume 1759a: 96). 
 5.3 Hume depicted Scotland at the time of the accession of James I and VI as a 
scene of 'feudal anarchy' (see esp. Hume 1754-57: I 58-61). As in the Archibald Stewart 
pamphlet, he presented Scotland as comprising two different 'races', Highland and 
Lowland. At this time, though, the manners of these races were more or less the same. 
Everywhere the Scots 'lived ... in a manner somewhat disorderly; governed by antient 
customs more than by laws, and attached to their own families more than to their prince 
or country' (59). Even before 1603, according to Hume, a Scottish king possessed little 
real power. The 'dawn of the arts' that had appeared in the rest of Europe in the previous 
century had been prevented from introducing order and obedience in Scotland by the 
particular way in which the Reformation arrived there. What Hume terms 'protestant 
fanaticism' only made the country harder to govern, for it weakened the authority of the 
nobility without adding to the power of the crown. 'Determined enemies to monarchy by 
principle as well as inclination,' Hume explained, 'the religious orators placed a vanity in 
affronting their prince, and would acknowledge no sovereign but Christ, whose throne, 
being established in heaven, imposed little restraint upon them' (61). While he was only 
king of Scotland, James managed the situation prudently, but as soon he was king of 
England too he made the catastrophic mistake of trying to impose upon Scotland the 
English form of worship and church governance -- which he, rightly, took to be more 
consonant with royal power. In the first edition of the first volume History of Great Britain 
Hume described in some detail the foolish measures taken by James to this end, and, in 
his account of the reign of Charles I, went some way toward justifying Scottish resistance 
to royal incursion upon their ecclesiastical privileges. He also detailed the ways in which 
Charles II and James II reiterated the mistakes of the early Stuarts, pursuing policies 
which were bound to be responded to with violence. The Revolution of 1688 thus 
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appears in Hume's narrative as what the Whigs claimed it was, a necessary means of 
ridding Scotland of tyranny. But Hume was explicit that it was at the same time an 
entirely novel departure for the Scots. 'The Scotch nation ...', he claimed, 'had but very 
imperfect notions of law and liberty; and scarce in any age had they ever enjoyed an 
administration, which had restrained itself with the proper boundaries. By their final 
union alone with England, their once hated antagonist, they have happily attained the 
experience of a government perfectly regular, and exempt from all violence and injustice' 
(Hume 1754-577: II 187). 
 5.4 There is less about Scotland in the second, 1759, edition of The History of Great 
Britain.11 By this time Hume was already worried that his history looked more Whiggish 
than he meant it to be. His anxiety on this score, his desire to be completely impartial in 
his presentation of the seventeenth century in particular, prompted Whigs in London to 
call him a Tory. In fact, as he told his friend John Clephane in September 1757, in some 
quarters he earned 'the reproach of the most terrible ism of them all, that of Jacobitism' 
(Greig 1932: I 264). This was of course nonsense. The fact that Hume was sceptical 
about the stories that Whigs told themselves did not mean that he was willing to believe 
in divinely ordained royal authority, handed down in an unbreakable chain from one king 
to his natural heir, and impossible to resist without criminal impiety. Hume made this 
perfectly clear in his presentation of the case of Mary Queen of Scots in the Tudor 
volumes of the History of England. By the middle of the eighteenth century, in the 
aftermath of the '45, Mary and her treatment at the hands of Elizabeth had become more 
than ever terrain on which Scottish Jacobites continued by proxy the struggle against 
Hanoverian usurpation. Hume made it clear that he did not believe that as an ordained 
monarch Mary could not legitimately be put on trial by anyone, nor that the right of 
hereditary succession meant that she had (through Henry VIII's elder sister) a claim to 
the English throne as well as the Scottish one. Mary was no martyr, no saintly innocent. 
Hume argued that she was guilty of involvement both in the murder of her first husband 
Lord Darnley and in the 1586 Babington plot against Elizabeth. In a long and closely-
reasoned footnote he gave no fewer than sixteen reasons to accept the authenticity of the 
'Casket Letters' implicating Mary in Darnley's death.  
 5.5 On the other hand, Hume sought to distinguish his account of Mary's life and 
death from the one favoured by most Scottish Whigs. He wanted his reader to notice 
that at no point did he rely upon what had been written about Mary by Knox, Buchanan, 
and Melville. To have done so would have made it too easy for Mary's supporters to 
dismiss his narrative as just another instance of Presbyterian bias and bigotry. Hume did 
not stint in his description of Mary's virtues, and of the beauty of her person. She was an 
'amiable princess' while her persecutor Knox was a 'rustic apostle'. '[S]he seemed to 
partake only so much of male virtues as to render her estimable', he rhapsodized, 
'without relinquishing those soft graces which compose the proper ornaments of her sex' 
(Hume 1759a: 622). His depiction of her death was just as overt in its attempt to enlist 
the reader's sympathy as his depiction of the execution of Charles I. Moreover, if she was 
guilty, so also were those who condemned her to death. Elizabeth was according to 
Hume an 'excellent hypocrite' in the way she had her half-sister executed and then 
pretended to be angry at those who had done her bidding. As so often in Hume's History, 
the reader of his portrait of Mary is pulled back and forth between opposing perspectives, 
and prevented from being able to settle into any of the usual ways of thinking, and 
feeling, about the issue. Hume was not alone in wanting to deal with Mary in a new way. 
                                                
11 Compare, for example, Hume 1754: 58-61 with Hume 1759b I: 52-3. Also, e.g., there is 
no account of the Articles of Perth in the 1759 version of the reign of James I. 
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There is a similar refusal to toe either of the usual party lines in William Robertson's 
History of Scotland, published in the same year as Hume's Tudor history.12 And the fact 
that he and Robertson remained friends despite the fact that they were in direct 
competition for the title of Britain's best historian was a cause of celebration to Hume. 
'Had you & I been such Fools to have given way to Jealousy, to have entertaind 
Animosity & Malignity against each other, and have rent all our Acquaintance into 
Parties', he wrote to Robertson, 'what a noble Amusement shoud we have exhibited to 
the Blockheads, which now they are likely to be disappointed of?' (Klibansky and 
Mossner 1954: 46). Hume and Robertson, like Hume and Wallace, and Hume and 
Balfour, were in alliance against those in Scotland who remained trapped in outdated, 
ossified modes of thought. 
 5.6 Robertson also shared Hume's scepticism about the Scottish Whig 
conception of a supposedly noble and free Scottish past. Scotland's kings had always 
been poor and weak, and had, like the Scottish people, been at the mercy of rapacious 
feudal lords. The feudal age had, for Robertson as for Hume, been an age not of 
freedom but of anarchy. In the 1750s, following the publication in 1748 of 
Montesquieu's De l'Esprit des Lois, feudalism had in fact come to be a matter of particular 
interest to Scottish historians. In 1757 John Dalrymple published An Essay towards a 
General History of Feudal Property in Great Britain, and a year later Kames brought out his 
Historical Law-Tracts. Both works sought to articulate what might be termed a British 
historical jurisprudence. They argued that Scottish and English law, despite their 
differences, had a common origin, and they were concerned to point out the respects in 
which Scotland was lagging behind its southern neighbour when it came to removing 
feudal impediments to a system of law adequate to a modern, commercial society. Earlier 
in the eighteenth century interest in feudalism had largely been the preserve of Tories 
concerned to show that the Norman invasion had been a conquest, and that henceforth 
the privileges of the people were to be understood as royal dispensations, revocable at 
the king's pleasure. English Whigs had downplayed the significance of feudal law, 
insisting that it did not supersede the Saxon common law tradition. The intense interest 
that Hume showed in English feudalism in the medieval volumes of the History of England 
is, it might be said, a distinctively Scottish element of his historiographical perspective. 
 5.7 In the works of Smith and Ferguson, in Robertson's Preface to his History of 
the Reign of Charles V, in Millar's Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, and indeed in Kames's 
Sketches of the History of Man, a historical and comparative jurisprudence was the 
foundation for universalist speculation about the history of civil society as such. Hume 
was, it might be said, distinctively un-Scottish in the fact that his history writing did not 
move in this direction. In his books there is no trace, for example, of the four-stage 
theory of history that begins with hunting and gathering and passes through shepherding 
and agriculture to culminate in commerce. Once he left behind Book Three of the 
Treatise's comparatively sketchy account of the origins of property and justice, Hume 
showed no systematic interest in the 'natural history of society'. As Forbes pointed out 
(1963: 289), it is surely significant that he never even used the phrase. In this respect 
Hume's history writing was conservative. He remained attached to the narrative structure 
provided by the successive reigns of kings and queens. At the same time, however, his 
aim was often only to show how the doings of kings and queens had little effect on the 
country's fortunes, or had effects quite different from those intended. He depicted 
                                                
12 Robertson agreed with Hume that Mary was involved in Darnley's murder, but did not 
accept that she had a part in the Babington plot. Hume discussed this difference of 
opinion in a letter to Robertson of November 1758: see Greig 1932: I 287-90. 
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England as in the grip of large-scale historical forces such as the decline of feudalism and 
the rise of the gentry and the commercial class, the Renaissance (or, 'the dawn of the 
arts'), the Reformation ('one of the greatest events in history' (Hume 1759: 116)), and the 
modern age's globalization of commerce. This was not the usual point of view of a writer 
of a general history of England. It was a point of view from which the usual business of 
praising some kings and statesmen and clerics and blaming others was apt to look 
pointless, if not absurd. It was the point of view, in other words, of the 'philosophical' 
historian: the historian who may have chosen to write about one particular country, but 
who placed that country in, if not a global, then certainly a European perspective. As 
Forbes puts it, Hume's History of England 'is not a history of English civilization, but of 
civilization in England' -- and 'the progress of civilization and "liberty" is a European, 
not an exclusively English theme' (Forbes 1970: 22-3). 
 5.8 Thus we return to Hume's supposed cosmopolitanism. The kind of 
cosmopolitanism characteristic of Hume, and also of historians such as Voltaire, 
Robertson, and Gibbon, is, according to Karen O'Brien, 'an attitude of detachment 
towards national prejudice ... and an intellectual investment in the idea of a common 
European civilization' (O'Brien 1997: 2). On O'Brien's view, as he pushed his History 
backwards in time, Hume came to be increasingly interested in the anomalousness of the 
English case, in the peculiar fact that as feudalism collapsed England did not follow the 
path towards a modern and civilized form of absolutism. As we have seen, Forbes 
(though not O'Brien) traces a link between Hume's cosmopolitanism and his 
Scottishness. But to the extent that the Scots, as Kidd shows, had their own form of 
parochial, illusion-laden Whiggism, Hume's Scottishness cannot by itself explain the kind 
of history that he wrote. There is in fact nothing about the complete History of England to 
identify it as the work of a Scotsman. This is more than a matter of Hume's enduring 
concern with ridding the book of 'Scotticisms'. Hume's goal was nothing less than that of 
replacing Rapin as the historian who could make sense of English history for the benefit 
of all of Europe. '[W]hat must foreigners do to get some notion of our history?' Hume 
asked Horace Walpole in August 1758 (Greig 1932: I 285). His History was his answer to 
his own question. Earlier in the same letter Hume confessed that he had been 'seduc'd by 
the example of all the best historians even among the moderns, such as Matchiavel, Fra 
paolo, Davila, Bentivoglio' (284).13 This explained not only his failure to quote his 
authorities in the first edition of the History of Great Britain but also the character of his 
ambitions as a historical writer. He intimated to Walpole that he wanted to join the 
historians who were essential reading for 'the learned throughout all Europe'. To that end 
it was essential that the differences be obvious between his History and the many books 
of those, Scots as well as Englishmen, who sought to do no more than advance the cause 






                                                
13 For useful commentary on this remark, see Wootton 2009. As Wootton puts it, like 
Sarpi (i.e. 'Fra paolo') especially, Hume 'sought to address a new audience: neither of 
politicians nor of antiquarians, but of those who aspired to participate in polite 
conversation' (451). 
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6.1 It is possible that from the very beginning Hume was at odds with the spirit of his 
countrymen when it came to religion. Hume told Boswell that he was religious enough 
when young to use a popular devotional tract, The Whole Duty of Man, as a means of self-
examination. He would go through it checking which vices he was subject to. 
Presumably this was one of the religious books to be found in the family library at 
Ninewells. But The Whole Duty of Man, published in England in 1658, was anti-Puritan 
and anti-Calvinist in spirit, and thus there is evidence here that the religion he was 
brought up into was, for the time and place, relatively liberal. It can be supposed that The 
Whole Duty of Man was approved by a man who must have played an important role in 
Hume's early years, the husband of his father's sister, George Home, minister at 
Chirnside from 1704 to 1741. At some point in his early teens, however, Hume lost his 
belief. He looked into the philosophical arguments for the existence of God to be found 
in Newton and Clarke, and found them wanting. According to some commentators, 
most recently Paul Russell, Hume was henceforth an atheist (see Russell 2008: 279-289). 
It is not obvious, however, that Hume believed in an alternative, non-religious, theory 
about the origins of the universe and about the nature of the fundamental powers at 
work in the world as we experience it. There seems to have been little affinity on this 
score between Hume and radical French writers like d'Holbach and Helvétius. Gibbon 
reported that such men 'laughed at the scepticism of Hume' (Gibbon 1984: 136). It is 
arguable that Hume's stance was rather that of a sceptic who believed in no grand 
metaphysical schemes whatsoever, whether theistic or materialist, who regarded all the 
big questions as unanswerable, and who held, like Philo in the Dialogues concerning Natural 
Religion, that we would do well instead to 'confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or 
politics, or criticism' (Hume 1779: 26). 
 6.2 In any case, the important thing for present purposes is not what Hume's 
personal beliefs were, but rather how he chose to write about religious subjects. His 
Scottish context is, perhaps, more important to understanding Hume in this connection 
than it is with regard to any of the topics covered so far in this chapter. Hume may have 
been increasingly concerned with how he was received on the pan-European stage, but 
throughout his literary career he found himself constantly drawn into the religious 
disputes of his native country, and when he wrote about religion, he seems always to 
have had those disputes close to the front of his mind. It would not be an exaggeration 
to say that Lowland Scotland, especially during the second and third quarters of the 
eighteenth century, was the site of an ongoing religious war. The conflict was between a 
modernizing, moderate understanding of Christianity, intent on harmonizing Scotland's 
religiosity with the spirit of the new age of politeness and commerce that had announced 
by the 1707 Act of Union, and a traditionalist orthodoxy animated by the spirit of the 
great covenanting movement of the previous century. It was a conflict played out in 
every aspect of Lowland life. It was a struggle for Scotland's soul. The deepest question 
was what kind of country was Scotland to become after the Union and the Hanoverian 
succession. Had the Covenanters been right to believe that the Reformation in Scotland 
had made possible a particularly close relationship between the Scottish people and God, 
a relationship that was imperiled by the erastianism and lax morals and depraved tastes of 
the English, or was the Union a God-given chance for Scotland to leave the extremism 
and violence of the past behind forever? Whether Hume was an atheist or a sceptic in his 
private beliefs, this was a question that he could not avoid. It was also a question that he 
could answer in only one way. If Hume probably did not care much about the more 
purely doctrinal elements of the conflict, nor about the vexed matter of how ministers 
were elected to their charges, he cared a great deal about wider cultural questions 
concerning, for example, university appointments, the status of the arts, and general 
freedom of expression. Just as he instinctively sided against the Jacobites during the '45 
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and afterwards, so also every fibre of his being set him at odds with the Calvinist 
reactionaries of what became known as the 'Popular' party of the Church of Scotland.  
6.3 It is possible, as we have seen, that Hume's family favoured the religion of the 
'Moderate' party.14 It is certain that, from the first, his friends did as well. Hutcheson, for 
instance, played an important role in the first stages of the battle for the modernization 
of the religious and moral culture of Scotland. So did another friend of Hume's at 
Glasgow, the professor of divinity William Leechman. The appointments of both men 
were opposed by Calvinist traditionalists. That they got their jobs anyway was a sign that 
things were changing. They knew, however, that the process of change could be 
drastically slowed, perhaps even reversed, by their opponents. There was no reason to 
think in the 1730s and 1740s that it was certain which way Scotland would turn. This was, 
perhaps, why Hutcheson and Leechman could not support Hume when his name was 
put forward for the Edinburgh chair of moral philosophy in the summer of 1744. In fact 
there was probably more than one reason for men like Hutcheson and Leechman, and 
also the principal of the University, William Wishart (who had also been on the receiving 
end of persecution by the orthodox), to think that Hume was not the right person for 
the job. For one thing, Hume could not be relied upon to take seriously enough the 
question of articulating and defending the kind of religion they wanted to see prevail. A 
professor of moral philosophy, after all, was obliged to lead his students through the 
arguments of natural religion. But also there was the fact that Hume was bound to used 
by the party of Calvinist orthodoxy as a means of discrediting the modernizers and 
moderates. He was easily associated with them, and it was imaginable that it would be 
insinuated as a result that they condoned, perhaps even sympathized with, the 'Heresy, 
Deism, Scepticism, Atheism &c &c &c' that Hume was charged with as soon as his 
candidacy was announced (Greig 1932: I 57).  
6.4 We can only speculate about why, exactly, Hutcheson, Hume, and Wishart 
opposed Hume's candidacy for the Edinburgh chair. The important thing is that it is not 
necessary to take Hume's failure to be appointed as a simple instance of philosophical 
freethinking pitted against conservative religiosity (see Stewart 1994). Matters in Scotland 
at the time were more complicated. There was also the political dimension of the affair 
(see Emerson 1994). University appointments were contests of strength between the 
Argyll interest and its 'Squadrone' rival, and in this instance, the Argathelians lost. When, 
in the winter of 1751-52, Hume's name was put forward for the logic chair at Glasgow, 
he did not even get to the stage of getting Argyll backing. In neither case, however, does 
Hume seem to have much wanted the job. 'I was never very fond of this Office of which 
I have been disappointed', he told Kames in June 1745, 'on account of the Restraint, 
which I forsaw it wou'd have impos'd on me' (Klibansky and Mossner 1954: 17). It is 
hard to imagine him celebrating getting the Glasgow chair with the enthusiasm with 
which he welcomed election to the position of Librarian to the Faculty of Advocates in 
February 1752 (see the letter to John Clephane dated 4 February (Greig 1932: I 164-67)). 
6.5 As part of the effort to ensure that Hume was not appointed to the 
Edinburgh chair, Wishart put out a pamphlet that represented the philosophy of the 
Treatise as dangerously sceptical as regards commonsense, morality, and religion. Hume 
responded point by point in a text that was published by Kames, possibly without 
Hume's knowledge, as A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh. As mentioned 
above, the episode prompted Hume to reconsider the sceptical dimension of his account 
of the human understanding, or rather, to reconsider the way in which he had presented 
                                                
14 For a study of the 'Popular' party, see McIntosh 1998. The best general account of the 
cultural dimension of the 'Moderate' party is Sher 1985. 
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his scepticism in the Treatise. The result was Philosophical Essays concerning Human 
Understanding, published in 1748, and retitled An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 
ten years later. This was not, though, in any sense a compromise on Hume's part. In no 
sense did the failure to win the Edinburgh chair cause Hume to tone down his views. On 
the contrary, Hume now included sceptical treatments of the rationality of belief in both 
natural religion and testimony of miracles. And he playfully pretended to cover himself 
from the charge of irreligion by frequently, like a good Calvinist, making use of the 
language of fideism to point out that the most secure foundation of religion is faith nor 
reason. He told Kames in February 1748 that he was 'indifferen[t] about all the 
consequences that may follow' (Greig 1932: I 111). It is possible that at this point in his 
career -- he was just about to leave with St. Clair for Vienna and Turin -- he felt he had 
left Scotland's religious squabbles behind him. If that was so, he was mistaken. The next 
year he returned to Ninewells, and some time soon afterwards began writing a work that 
dramatizes the situation of a sceptic caught in the crossfire between moderate religion 
and orthodoxy.  
6.6 Though not published until three years after Hume's death, Dialogues concerning 
Natural Religion existed in draft form as early as spring 1751. Hume told Gilbert Elliot 
that he imagined that a dialogue on such a subject was best composed by two people. 
Had he and Elliot lived near each other, they might have tried this. 'I shou'd have taken 
on me the Character of Philo', he wrote, 'which you'll own I coud have supported 
naturally enough' (Greig 1932: I 154). Elliot, he continued, 'would not have been averse' 
to the character of Cleanthes -- and nor, perhaps, would a number of those among the 
Moderates who became Hume's friends, including Wallace, Ferguson, Robertson, John 
Home, Hugh Blair, and Alexander Carlyle. They were all men who regarded practice, not 
doctrine, as the essence of the Christian religion, and, when it came to the defence of the 
central principles of theism, were confident in the capacity of experimental natural 
philosophy to give religion a rational foundation. The part of Demea, on the other hand, 
who after a rather clumsy defence of a priori religious argument asserts that each man's 
feeling of the truth of religion derives in the first instance from 'a consciousness of his 
imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning' (Hume 1779: 171), might have 
been taken by a member of the 'Popular' party. For a large part of the Dialogues Hume 
presents Philo and Demea as in alliance against the probabilistic, inductivist arguments 
put forward by Cleanthes, but at the end, Demea leaves the room, finally aware that 
Philo might be 'a more dangerous enemy than Cleanthes himself' (223), and the stage is 
set for Philo to try to convince Cleanthes that the disagreement between them about 
what can be rationally asserted about the cause of the universe is a mere 'dispute of 
words'. This can be read as an attempt on Hume's part to convince his friends among the 
men of moderation that, were they to understand their own religious claims better, they 
would see that Hume believed just the same things that they did. But the conclusion of 
the Dialogues also registers Hume's awareness that full reconciliation between sceptic and 
theist was in truth not possible. The final, insurmountable, or at least unsurmounted, 
disagreement between Philo and Cleanthes concerns the practical role of religion. As 
Philo sees it, the choice is between genuinely rational (and extremely minimal) religion on 
the one hand, a religion which crucially has no practical consequences whatsoever, and 
rank superstition on the other. Cleanthes has a more nuanced view. 'Religion, however 
corrupted,' he says, 'is still better than no religion at all' (242). Religion has a practical role 
to play in ordinary life, he believes, and if elements of superstition help it play that role, 
then so be it. This is, perhaps, an acknowledgment on Hume's part of a crucial difference 
between him and his Moderate friends: they were much more involved than he cared to 
be in the business of making a difference to, improving, the lives that people lived. 
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6.7 Hume's other great contribution to the philosophy of religion, 'The Natural 
History of Religion', can also be read as an intervention in the quarrel between the 
Moderates and the Popular Party. It was being dragged into that quarrel in 1755 that 
seems to have prompted Hume to publish the 'Natural History', a work that was 
probably written between 1749 and 1751, at the same time as the Dialogues. Hume, along 
with Kames, was threatened by the Popular Party with excommunication from the 
Church of Scotland during the meeting of the General Assembly of May 1755, and again 
the following year. It is doubtful that those who made this threat really cared that much 
about the fate of either Hume or Kames. It is more likely that what they wanted was to 
involve the Moderates in the controversy, and to get them to discredit themselves -- as 
the Popular Party saw it -- by defending their scandalous friends. If so, they got what 
they wanted. The Moderates rallied behind Hume and Kames and ensured that the move 
against them never reached the floor of the General Assembly (see Sher 1985: 65-74). 
Hume may have imagined that 'The Natural History of Religion' would help in the 
general struggle against the forces of reaction and intolerance. It added a historical 
dimension to the opposition between philosophical (or, 'true') religion and superstition, 
and, while for the most part it concentrated on Catholicism and Islam as instances of 
superstition, it included a footnote quoting at length from the Catholic Chevalier 
Ramsay's indictment of the Calvinist doctrines of eternal reprobation and predestination 
(see Hume 1757: 99-102). The fact that in 1756 the forces of reaction switched their 
attentions from him and Kames to John Home and his play Douglas prompted Hume to 
dedicate the work in which the 'Natural History' appeared, Four Dissertations, to Home. 
The dedication -- the only one Hume ever wrote -- gives a clear sense of the importance 
Hume attached to being able to live on amicable terms with the men of the Moderate 
party. He wrote of a 'true liberty, of which antient times can alone afford us an example', 
'the liberty of thought, which engaged men of letters, however different in their abstract 
opinions, to maintain a mutual friendship and regard; and never to quarrel about 
principles, while they agreed in inclinations and manners' (Hume 1757: ii). The 
dedication was meant to be understood as a renewal of this ancient practice. The 'Natural 
History', then, should not be read as a crude broadside assault on religion as such. It is in 
fact an argument to the effect that what needs to be attended to are the different 
historical manifestations of the religious impulse, and it allows that some forms of 
religion are very much more corrupt, and pernicious, than others. It is just possible that 
Hume expected the Moderates to welcome it as a contribution to their struggle against 
the Calvinists. 
6.8 If this is what he expected, he was naive. There was much in the 'Natural 
History' that evinced the ironical detachment from religious questions that set Hume 
apart from almost all of his contemporaries. It was obvious that for Hume religion was 
an entirely speculative issue, not something that was of any relevance to how he lived his 
life. And in fact, Hume probably wanted not so much agreement with the argument of 
the 'Natural History', or with the argument of his other writings on religion, as a 
willingness in others to take the argument seriously, to engage with it on its own terms. 
This, so the dedication to Four Dissertations suggests, was what really mattered to him. He 
was not always disappointed in this desire. His Moderate friends in Edinburgh as a rule 
refused to engage with him. Their response to the Dialogues was to hope that it would 
never be published. But there were those in Scotland prepared to argue back on behalf of 
rational religion, most notably the Aberdeen professor George Campbell in A Dissertation 
on Miracles. In June 1762 Hume wrote to Campbell to compliment him on the 'ingenuity' 
and 'great learning' of his book. It has very seldom happened, Hume noted, 'that 
controversies in philosophy, much more in theology, have been carried on without 
producing a personal quarrel between the parties' (Greig 1932: I 360). Hume also wrote 
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to Reid to acknowledge the seriousness of the challenge to scepticism in general, 
including scepticism about religion, presented in An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the 
Principles of Common Sense (see Wood 1987). Not every Scottish critic of Hume on religion, 
in other words, attacked him with the ad hominem ferocity of Beattie in An Essay on Truth, 
and Hume was alive to the differences between his various opponents. Hume's most 
severe critics, on the other hand, Beattie among them, sought to efface the differences 
between Hume and those who openly declared themselves hostile to Christianity. In his 
portrait of Beattie, Joshua Reynolds paired Hume with Voltaire. Yet Hume lacked 
Voltaire's sense of the vileness, l'infâme, of the Christian religion as such. His view, made 
most clear in the History of England, was that religion tended to be source of dangerous 
delusion, intolerance, and violence. It was often a means whereby bad people concealed 
their worst vices. Human society in general would doubtless be better off without it. But, 
so the 'Natural History' suggested, the origins of religion lay deep within human nature, 
so deep that a world without religion was inconceivable. The most pressing question, 
then, was the political one of how religion was to be managed so as to cause as little 
harm as possible. The Presbyterian model of church governance was endorsed by Hume 
in 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', but only given the overall supervision of the clergy 
by the supreme magistrate. Without such supervision -- which was what the Popular 
Party in Scotland abhorred most of all -- ''tis folly to think any free government will ever 
have security or stability' (Hume 1752: 298). Such, in any case, was the lesson of history 






7.1 In the summer of 1769 Hume returned to Edinburgh after two and a half years in 
London. He had been Deputy Secretary of State in the Department between February 
1767 and January 1768, and had then remained in London for eighteen further months. 
Presumably he stayed on simply because he was enjoying living there. He was, he told 
Elliott, 'dining at all the great Tables that remain in London' (Greig 1932: II 184). But 
this was the time of the riots for 'Wilkes and Liberty', and anti-Scottish sentiment was 
everywhere on the streets and in the press. Hume headed north with relief. In October 
he wrote to Elliott that he was in Edinburgh 'Body & Soul, without casting the least 
Thought of Regreat to London, or even to Paris' (Greig 1932: II 208). The time he had 
spent in Paris between 1763 and 1766 had inspired him for a while with the idea of 
retiring in the end to the City of Light. He had written from Paris in 1764 that he 
conceived of himself as a 'Citizen of the World' (Greig 1932: I 470), glad to be out of 
Britain both North and South. Now, though, it seemed unlikely that he would ever again 
so much as cross the Tweed. The madness of the London mob, exacerbated so he 
thought by the reluctance of the government to enact measures as draconian as the 
situation called for, made Edinburgh feel like a haven of calm and sanity. From there he 
watched with equanimity as crisis in London was followed by crisis in the American 
colonies. His letters of the early 1770s repeatedly express confidence that any attempt to 
impose British rule by force on the Americans was bound to be a disaster. Sometimes his 
pessimism generalized into the conviction that the post-1688 constitutional experiment  
had been a failure, and that there was bound soon to be a complete collapse of political 
order, to be followed, inevitably, by tyranny of one kind or another. This was where a 
populist politics of imperial expansion would inevitably lead. Hume pretends in his 
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letters that he doesn't care, that in fact he welcomes the coming catastrophe. This was, as 
John Pocock has observed, 'very much a view from Edinburgh' (Pocock 1985: 125). Late 
in life Hume seems to have felt a renewed sense of all that differentiated him from the 
English. This did not mean that he stopped feeling British. It meant merely that he was 
once again sharply aware that he was Scottish, and that the mistakes being made in 
London were, for the most part, being made by Englishmen. 
 7.2 There was a literary dimension to the view from Edinburgh. When, in the 
spring of 1776, Gibbon published the first volume of the Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire, Hume wrote to him to express his surprise that such a performance was the work 
of an Englishman. It seemed to him, he told Gibbon, 'that your Countrymen, for almost 
a whole Generation, have given themselves up to a barbarous and absurd Faction, and 
have totally  neglected all polite Letters', so much so that 'I no longer expected any 
valuable Production ever to come from them' (Greig 1932: II 310). Scotland had 
overtaken England when it came to literature, and especially when it came to history. In 
August 1770 he had told his publisher William Strahan that he believed that this was 'the 
historical Age' and that Scotland was 'the historical Nation'. There were at the time 'no 
less than eight Histories on the stocks in this Country' (Greig 1932: II 230). 'The best 
Book, that has been writ by any Englishman these thirty Years', he opined in January 
1773, 'is Tristram Shandy, bad as it is' (Greig 1932: II 269). Hume took a keen interest in 
all that was published by his Scottish contemporaries. He gave Smith's Wealth of Nations  
an enthusiastic welcome, but on his death bed he also took up Campbell's recently 
published Philosophy of Rhetoric. This is a reminder that 'Enlightenment' in Scotland in the 
eighteenth century was not a matter of the success of any one particular system of 
philosophy, or of the implementation of any one social and political programme. 
Campbell and Wallace were just as much part of it as were Hume and Smith. 
Enlightenment in Scotland can be best defined, perhaps, in terms the ability and 
willingness of a remarkable number of Scots to take part in a conversation about 
questions philosophical, political, historical, scientific, and critical, and to keep that 
conversation going in a spirit of open-mindedness, politeness, and elegance. Hume was 
always party to the conversation, and he rejoiced in the fact that it did not usually matter 
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